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Abstract. A marketplace is defined where the private data of suppliers
(e.g., prosumers) are protected, so that neither their identity nor their
level of stock is made known to end customers, while they can sell their
products at a reduced price. A broker acts as an intermediary, which
takes care of providing the items missing to meet the customers’ demand
and allows end customers to take advantages of reduced prices through
the subscription of option contracts. Formulas are provided for the option
price under three different probability models for the availability of items.
Option pricing allows the broker to partially transfer its risk on end
customers.
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1 Introduction
Though privacy has been defined as the claim of individuals, groups, or insti-
tutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others [13], the right of individuals, rather than
companies, to protect their personal data has so far been the focus of most
privacy studies. This is especially true in the context of marketplaces, where
consumers may release, deliberately or not, details about themselves and the
items they purchase. Algorithms and platforms have been devised to enforce
customers’ privacy requirements (see, e.g., [7,6]), but little attention has been
paid to the other side of trading, i.e., companies selling their products.
However, a company may wish to select the level of information it provides
to its customers, but the widespread adoption of e-shops divulges a lot of details
about company’s operations, not just to prospective customers but to everyone
accessing the e-commerce platform, including competitors. For example, compa-
nies may wish to keep their level of stock for a given product secret. The issue is
even more delicate when traders are actually prosumers, who, acting as sellers,
may reveal personal data; an example of such a context is that of smart grids [1].
Generally speaking, individuals acting as suppliers may wish not to be profiled
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2and rather keep secret the products they happen to own. The definition of a
marketplace where suppliers can sell their products while retaining privacy is
then a relevant issue.
Such a definition has been proposed in [9], where the information to be
protected is the identity of the sellers and their level of stock, and the role of a
broker is envisaged. It was shown that such a marketplace may be set up with
benefits for all the stakeholders (a broker/producer, privacy-aware suppliers,
and end customers) through the use of differential privacy mechanisms [4] and
option contracts subscribed by end customers [10]. A general formula for option
pricing has been derived in [10], where nothing at all is known about the actual
availability of items by the suppliers.
In this paper, we embrace the marketplace definition provided in [9] and con-
sider the case where the broker, though it doesn’t know the actual number of
available items, may adopt a hypothesis concerning their probability distribu-
tion. In particular, we consider the cases where the stocks owned by suppliers
exhibits either full or null correlation (i.e., respectively perfectly correlated stocks
and independent suppliers) and a third case where a uniform distribution ap-
plies (representing a mild correlation). For each case we derive a formula for the
option price. We show that the using such an option price allows the broker to
transfer its risk to end customers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the marketplace
and the stakeholders, while the option contract between the broker and end
customers is described in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the three models
for the availability of items, which are used to derive the option pricing formulas
in Section 5.
2 A market for privacy-aware suppliers
Let’s consider a database of suppliers where information can be obtained about
the availability of a set of items, but suppliers are somewhat screened. Suppliers
could be vendors whose typical line of business does not include those products
or who wish to get rid of some remainders, or individuals (prosumers) who hap-
pen to have those products in their availability. For example, the database could
contain the number of items available for sale at each supplier, so that the ver-
tical sum across all suppliers included in the database would tell us the overall
number of items available. Such a database, providing statistics about the enti-
ties included in it, is called a statistical database [12]. However, in a statistical
database, releasing statistical information may compromise the privacy of indi-
vidual contributors. But suppliers may wish not to divulge those information; for
example they do not want competitors (who could access the database) to know
their level of stock, or, as individuals, they do not wish to be profiled about the
items they own. If suppliers wish to be screened, a curator may sit between the
users, posing the query, and the database. The responses to these queries may
be modified by the curator in order to protect the privacy of the contributors
[3], for example so as not to tell us exactly either which supplier can provide us
3with those items or how many items in the set are available. Instead of providing
the exact number, the database provides us with an obfuscated number, which
is more or less close to the exact figure. A mechanism to achieve differential
privacy is the use of noisy sums: the response to a counting query is the sum of
the true figure and some noise [4]. The use of a statistical database plus the use
of noisy sums may therefore protect the private information of suppliers.
When end customers demand for a number of items, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the actual availability of those items doesn’t allow to close deals. In
the presence of such privacy constraints, we postulate that a market can develop
through the introduction of a broker/producer and the use of option contracts.
Let’s consider the case where end customers demand for k∗ items. A broker
commits to provide them with the number of items required. In fact, the broker
may procure those items either by producing them itself (at a unit production
cost cp) or by resorting to privacy-aware suppliers, whose availability is known
through the statistical database previously mentioned. As already said, privacy-
aware suppliers do not release full information about the availability of their
products, but release instead an obfuscated number kˆ, which is generally different
from the true number k of items that they can provide (though the broker may
obtain a refined estimate of the true number through Bayesian analysis [8]).
The privacy enjoyed by privacy-aware suppliers is reflected in the price cs
they advertise. Prices set by privacy-aware suppliers depend on the level of ob-
fuscation (i.e. privacy protection): the higher the level of obfuscation (embodied
by the variance of the added noise), the lower the price. Assuming cs < cp, the
broker has a real advantage to procure as many items as it can through privacy-
aware suppliers at the reduced price cs, and transfer part of that benefit to end
customers by setting a lower end price. If the availability of items is not enough
to satisfy the demand (k < k∗), the broker/producer produces the remaining
items (but does not enjoy the full benefit of the reduced price).
In order to exploit the offer by privacy-aware suppliers, the broker submits a
query to the statistical database containing information about the availability of
items and pays a fixed amount cq and receives the noisy response kˆ. It commits
to buy all the k items available, though they may exceed the actual demand
k∗. When the actual number of available items is disclosed (at delivery), it pays
the privacy-aware suppliers the overall amount csk. If the demand is fully met
(k > k∗) the broker does not have to produce any item; otherwise, the broker
has to produce k∗ − k items at the unit cost cp. The resulting supply chain is
shown in Fig. 1.
It is to be noted that both curator and the broker in the end know the exact
number of items available by the suppliers, but they have (different) reasons
to keep it private. In fact, the database curator does not have a direct contact
with end customers and is not in the business of retailing. Instead, the broker’s
business relies on the privacy of those data for its intermediary role. In addition,
the roles of the curator and the broker may have to be kept separate due to
regulatory constraints.
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(reduced price)
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Fig. 1. Supply relationships
However, such a procedure is not free of risks for the broker/producer, which,
on the one hand commits to provide its customers with the required items, but
on the other hand is subject to the uncertainty determined by the unknown
availability of items delivered by privacy-aware suppliers, with the risks deriving
from the commitments to buy all the items available and, if required, to produce
the remaining ones at a higher cost.
The broker/producer has therefore to hedge against such risks. A way we
suggest is to resort to option contracts, which are described in the next section.
3 Risk coverage through options
As seen in the previous section, the broker/producer undergoes a risk when
resorting to privacy-aware suppliers in order to meet customers’ demand at a
reduced cost, a benefit which it transfers to end customers through a reduced
price. It needs however to hedge against such a risk. In this section we describe a
mechanism, based on option contracts, by which it can achieve such protection.
Since the stakeholders that ultimately benefit from resorting to privacy-aware
suppliers are end customers, the broker/producer may transfer some of that risk
to them, asking them to pay a price to get the right to buy the desired number
of items at a predetermined lower price (i.e., a booking fee). In the language of
financial markets, this is a call option, since it endows the end customer with
5the right to buy [5]. End customers are then required to subscribe a call option
to be sure to get the right number of items they wish at a reduced price.
A critical issue in option contract is setting the right price. In the typical
scenario, the amount to be paid for the option contract is expected to depend
on the current value of the items for sale, the predetermined price to be paid if
the option is exercised, and the expected behaviour of the item’s value in the
period from the option contract underwriting to the exercise time. A simple form
of pricing is given by the Black-Scholes formula [2], but a form tailored for the
context is to be derived here.
The general expression for the option price is
copt = E[cs(k − k∗)+|kˆ], (1)
which considers the risk due to the extra-cost of buying the excess items pro-
vided by privacy-aware suppliers. In [10], the risk of having to buy the items
exceeding the demand has been analysed, and the following pricing formula has
been derived for the case where Laplacian noise is added to form the noisy sum
[11]:
copt = cs
[
(kˆ − k∗)+ + 1
2λ
e−λ|kˆ−k
∗|
]
, (2)
where λ is the shape parameter of the Laplace distribution: the smaller λ, the
greater the differential privacy. In that formula, the declared value kˆ was con-
sidered as the best estimate of the actual availability.
However, if we have some a priori information about the actual availability,
we can gain a better estimate for it and obtain a more accurate formula for the
option price. In [8], we have shown that Bayesian analysis mat be used to obtain
a better estimate of the figure previously obfuscated through the addition of
Laplace noise. Here we exploit the same mechanism to obtain a better estimate
of the actual availability. In the next section we describe three models that may
provide the a priori information we need to apply Bayes estimation.
4 Models for items availability
The extra-cost incurred by the broker to get the items through privacy-aware
suppliers depends on the number of items actually available. This is unknown to
the broker till the disclosure by those suppliers when setting the deal. However,
models may be adopted for the envisaged availability that allow us to obtain a
formula for the option price once the declared availability kˆ is made known. In
this section, we describe three models, which represent three paradigmatic situ-
ations: unit correlation, independent suppliers, and uniform distribution (which
represents a mild correlation).
The case of unit correlation applies when either all the suppliers have the
item or none of them have it. Their behaviour shows therefore full correlation,
hence the name given to the model. The number of availabile items may therefore
6take just either of two values: 0 or n. The probability associated to the two cases
is
P[k = 0] = 1− p
P[k = n] = p.
(3)
The case opposite to full correlation is that of no correlation at all, where the
availability of the item by any supplier is independent of any other suppliers.
If we now indicate the probability of any supplier to have the item by p, the
probability of the number of available items follows a binomial distribution with
parameters p and n:
P[k = i] =
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i i = 0, 1, . . . , n. (4)
Finally, as an intermediate case between those of no correlation and unit
correlation, we can consider the case of uniform distribution
P[k = i] =
1
n+ 1
i = 0, 1, . . . , n. (5)
5 Formulas for risk transfer
After defining the three paradigmatic models for the availability of items, in this
section we derive the pricing formulas for the three cases.
5.1 Unit correlation
In the case of unit correlation, the number of actually available items may take
either of two values k = 0 and k = n, as defined in Equation (3).
The extra-cost is then
E[cs(k − k∗)+|kˆ = x] = cs{P[k = 0|kˆ = x](0− k∗)+ + P[k = n|kˆ = x](n− k∗)+}
= csP[k = n|kˆ = x](n− k∗)
(6)
This expression is still dependent on the conditional probability P[k = n|kˆ =
x], which we may obtain through Bayes’ theorem
P[k = n|kˆ = x] = P[k = n]P[kˆ = x|k = n]
P[kˆ = x]
=
P[k = n]P[kˆ = x|k = n]
P[kˆ = 0]|P[kˆ = x|k = 0] + P[kˆ = n]|P[kˆ = x|k = n]
=
pλ2 e
−λ|n−x|
(1− p)λ2 e−λ|x| + pλ2 e−λ|n−x|
=
1
1 + 1−pp e
−λ[|x|−|n−x|]
(7)
7By replacing the expression (7) in the extra-cost expression (6) we finally obtain
E[cs(k − k∗)+|kˆ = x] = cs(n− k
∗)
1 + 1−pp e
−λ[|x|−|n−x|] (8)
If we assume that the declaration falls within the limits of the range of
suppliers, i.e., 0 ≤ kˆ ≤ n, we have
copt =
cs(n− k∗)
1 + 1−pp e
−λ[x−(n−x)]
=
csn(1− k∗/n)
1 + 1−pp e
−λ(2x−n)
(9)
If we consider the price as a function of the declared number of available
items, we see that the price switches quite abruptly between two values. When
kˆ = 0, the normalized price is
copt
csn
=
(1− k∗/n)
1 + 1−pp e
λn
' 0 n 1 (10)
Instead, when we are on the opposite side of declared values, kˆ = n, we have
copt
csn
=
(1− k∗/n)
1 + 1−pp e
−λn ' 1− k
∗/n n 1 (11)
The turning point between the two values is kˆ = n/2
A set of price curves are shown in Fig. 2 for n = 100 suppliers, λ = 1.5, and
p = 0.5. As we can see the normalized option price is practically zero when the
declared availability is kˆ < n/2 and nearly 1−k∗/n when the declared availability
is kˆ > n/2. The only parameters that actually impact the price are the demand
k∗ and the declared availability kˆ. The probability p of the suppliers having all
the items plays a negligible role, just in the small range around kˆ = n/2. In
practice, this means that the end customer switches from paying nothing (when
the declared availability is less than half the number of suppliers) to paying
almost the full price of the items available but not required (when the declared
availability is more than half the number of suppliers). In the latter case there
is practically a complete transfer of risk.
5.2 Independent suppliers
In the case of independent suppliers, each one having the item with probability
p, the number of actually available items follows a binomial distribution with
parameters n and p, as described in Section 4.
Since the broker will incur an extra-cost for the items that it has to buy
from the suppliers in excess of the actual demand, the extra-cost suffered by the
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Fig. 2. Impact of demand on option price (correlated suppliers)
broker is
copt = E[cs(k− k∗)+|x < kˆ < x+ dx] =
n∑
i=k∗+1
cs(i− k∗)P[k = i|x < kˆ < x+ dx]
(12)
Again by Bayes’ theorem we have
P[k = i|x < kˆ < x+ dx] = P[k = i]P[x < kˆ < x+ dx|k = i]
P[x < kˆ < x+ dx]
=
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i 12λe−λ|x−i|∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j 12λe−λ|x−j|
,
(13)
that, when replaced in Equation (12), provides
copt = cs
∑n
i=k∗+1(i− k∗)
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i 12λe−λ|x−i|∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j 12λe−λ|x−j|
= cs
∑n
i=k∗+1(i− k∗)
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−ie−λ|x−i|∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−je−λ|x−j|
(14)
We now examine the dependence of the option price on the following param-
eters:
– Declared availability kˆ
– Demand k∗
9– Probability p of individual availability
We first plot the normalized option price copt/csn for three different values
of demand (again, with n = 100 suppliers, λ = 1.5, and p = 0.5) in Fig. 3. We
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Fig. 3. Impact of demand on option price (independent suppliers)
see again the option price transitioning from a very low value to a high one as
the suppliers declare a higher availability. From Equation (14) the low and high
value result
min copt = cs
∑n
i=k∗+1(i− k∗)
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−ie−λi∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−je−λj
max copt = cs
∑n
i=k∗+1(i− k∗)
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−ie−λ(n−i)∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−je−λ(n−j)
= cs
∑n
i=k∗+1(i− k∗)
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−ieλi∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−jeλj
(15)
But there are two important differences with respect to the case of perfectly
correlated suppliers:
– the low value is not always practically zero, but rises over zero when the
demand is low;
– the transition from low to high is quite smooth rather than abrupt as in the
cases of perfect correlation.
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In order to examine the impact of the probability of individual availability,
we can consider the set of curves in Fig. 4, where n = 100, k∗ = 50, and λ = 1.5.
We observe a similar behaviour as in the previous curves, where now higher
values of the individual probability push the price up.
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Fig. 4. Impact of individual availability probability on option price (independent sup-
pliers)
Summing up, we can conclude that low demand, high declared availability,
and high individual availability probability lead to higher option prices.
5.3 Uniform availability
The third model we consider is the uniform distribution, which is tantamount
to assuming that we have no specific hypothesis for the availability of items.
As in the previous two models, we proceed to define the extra-cost
E[cs(k− k∗)+|x < kˆ < x+ dx] =
n∑
i=k∗+1
cs(i− k∗)P[k = i|x < kˆ < x+ dx], (16)
11
and to evaluate the conditional probability through Bayes’ theorem (in this case
the uniform distribution is a non informative prior)
P[k = i|x < kˆ < x+ dx] = P[k = i]P[x < kˆ < x+ dx|k = i]
P[x < kˆ < x+ dx]
=
1
n+1
1
2λe
−λ|x−i|∑n
j=0
1
n+1
1
2λe
−λ|x−j|
=
e−λ|x−i|∑n
j=0 e
−λ|x−j| ,
(17)
which, replaced in Equation (16), provides us with the final expression of the
extra-cost
copt =
n∑
i=k∗+1
cs(i− k∗) e
−λ|x−i|∑n
j=0 e
−λ|x−j|
= cs
∑n
i=k∗+1(i− k∗)e−λ|x−i|∑n
j=0 e
−λ|x−j|
(18)
Now the only parameters are the demand k∗ and the declared availability kˆ.
We plot three sample curves for the normalized price copt/csn in Fig. 5, again
for n = 100 suppliers and λ = 1.5. We see that we obtain a piecewise linear
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Fig. 5. Impact of individual availability probability on option price (uniform availabil-
ity)
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curve with a knee in kˆ = k∗, that can be approximated by the formula
copt
csn
=
(kˆ − k∗)+
n
. (19)
In this case the risk transfer may be partial or excessive. If the noise added
is negative, so that the suppliers declare an availability lower than real (kˆ < k),
the price of the option is
copt = cs(kˆ − k∗)+ < cs(k − k∗)+, (20)
so that not the whole risk is transferred to end customers. The opposite case
occurs when kˆ > k, which may make end customers pay more than the actual
risk.
6 Conclusions
The issue of option contracts in a privacy-aware market has been analysed, where
the identity and level of stock of suppliers are kept hidden from end customers
and potential competitors through a differential privacy scheme by the addition
of Laplace noise. The scheme employs a broker that acts as an intermediary
between suppliers and end customers. Pricing formulas for the option have been
derived under three different models for the availability of items, which respec-
tively assume a perfect correlation between suppliers, their independence (hence,
perfect uncorrelation), or a uniform distribution (hence, a mild correlation). The
option contract allows the broker to transfer part of its risk to end customers.
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